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FROM NEW DEAL LIBERAL TO SUPREME COURT
CONSERVATIVE: THE METAMORPHOSIS OF
JUSTICE SHERMAN MINTON
DAVID N. ATKINSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
Every Justice sitting on the United States Supreme Court is a full
participant in the institution's decision-making process. Although each
Justice's judicial behavior has direct effect during only a relatively short
period in the history of the Court, the eventual impact of that behavior
may be enduring. There is at least a possibility that any Justice, however
minor in the panorama of Court history, may have some impact-be it
functional or dysfunctional-on long-term constitutional development,
the Supreme Court's status as an institution in the American political
system, the Court's short-term determination of public policy, and the
Court's ability to perform its day-to-day work.
Justice Sherman Minton served on the Supreme Court from 1949 to
1956. He was the eighty-seventh person to sit on the Court and the first
from the state of Indiana. While Minton clearly was not a Justice of
major stature, his development from politician to jurist deserves study.
Much of the evidence presented in this Article points to the value of a
theory of judicial role in offering plausible explanations of certain
aspects of Minton's behavior as a Supreme Court Justice.1 Thus an
attempt, however limited, is made to explain as well as describe judicial
behavior.
Judicial role in its most general formulation is "a consistent pattern
of behavior on the part of an individual in response to his conception
of the nature of his function in a system."2 Very often, analyses based
on judicial role have been self-fulfilling. That is, a behavior pattern
* Professor of Political Science, University of Missouri-Kansas City; B.A., M.A.,
J.D., Ph.D., University of Iowa.
1. This Article complements two other articles by the author on Justice Minton:
Atkinson, Justice Sherman Minton and the Balance of Liberty, 50 IND. L.J 34 (1974);
Atkinson, Justice Sherman Minton and Behavior Patterns Inside the Supreme Court, 69
Nw. U.L. REv. 716 (1974).
2. Grossman, Role-Playing and the Analysis of Judicial Behavior: The Case of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, 11 1. PuB. LAW 285, 294 (1962).
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is described and the actor's role is then defined with reference only
to the behavior described. It is, for example, self-fulfilling to examine
only a Supreme Court Justice's voting record and then attribute a role
definition to him. Consequently, in order to explain the nature of Jus-
tice Minton's role on the Court, extrinsic data have been obtained from
law clerks, Court papers, and other Justices. 8 These data indicate that
Minton frequently voted in conformity with his role conception instead
of his policy preferences, voting as he believed a Supreme Court Jus-
tice ought to vote rather than as he would have preferred to vote. A
consideration of Minton's perception of his judicial role may be of value
in understanding how one of the most "liberal" New Deal Senators
could become one of the most "conservative" Justices in recent Court
history.
C. Herman Pritchett's Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court is espe-
cially relevant, for it includes an analytic evaluation of the role percep-
tion, derived principally from the cases, of the Court members with
whom Minton served. Pritchett isolated two factors he believed most
influenced a Justice's voting behavior in civil liberties cases. One was
"the direction and intensity of a justice's libertarian sympathies, which
will vary according to his weighing of the relative claims of liberty and
order in our society," and the second was "the conception which the
justice holds of his judicial role and the obligations imposed on him by
his judicial function." 4 Pritchett described the nature and importance
of judicial role as follows:
Every justice in deciding a case must give some thought to what is ap-
propriate for him as a judge to do. The pressures which bear upon him
are many, and they are mostly toward a pattern of conformity-con-
3. This Article is based upon personal interviews conducted by the author
with Chief Justice Earl Warren, Justice Stanley Reed, Justice Hugo L. Black,
Justice William 0. Douglas, Justice Tom C. Clark, Justice John Marshall Har-
lan, and many of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks and his secretary. Ad-
ditional information was drawn from the Supreme Court papers of Justices
Minton, Burton, and Felix Frankfurter as well as the latter's private corres-
pondence. Justice Minton's papers are in the Harry S. Truman Library, Inde-
pendence, Missouri, while those of Justices Burton and Frankfurter are on file
in the Library of Congress.
The comments of Justice Minton's law clerks were taken from both question-
naire responses and personal interviews. This project was largely made possible
through their cooperation. It was necessary, however, to assure anonymity in
return for their openness and candor.
Atkinson, Justice Sherman Minton and Behavior Patterns Inside the Supreme Court, 69
Nw. U.L. REv. 716 n.1 (1974).
4. C. Pmrcamr, Cv L LmERTms AND Trn VmoN CouRT 191 (1954).
[Vol. 1975:361
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/2
JUSTICE SHERMAN MINTON
formity with precedents, conformity with the traditions of the law, con-
formity with public expectations as to how a judge should act, conform-
ity toward established divisions of authority in a federal system based
on the principle of separation of powers. While no justice can be oblivi-
ous to these pressures, they are not self-enforcing, and he is free to make
his own interpretations of their requirements in guiding his own judicial
conduct. The attitude scale involved may be thought of as ranging from
an expansionist to a contractionist judicial philosophy, from broad to
narrow judicial review, from judicial activism to judicial restraint.5
II. THE VINSON COURT IN PERSPECTIVE
Without disputing Emerson's confident dictum: "There is properly no
history; only biography,"6 it is nonetheless likely that political events
in the 1930's significantly influenced Sherman Minton's view of the ju-
dicial function. In his perception of the functions of the branches of
government, Minton was fundamentally a product of the New Deal.
Like other Justices who later comprised the Vinson Court (a term of
convenience used here to designate the years of Minton's service),
many of his ideas on the proper role of the Supreme Court within the
American system of government had been forged in the rough-and-
tumble arena of New Deal politics. 7 A good measure of the caution that
characterized the Vinson Court's exercise of judicial review can be
attributed to a pervasive fear by a majority of the Justices that the Court
might inadvertently trespass on the constitutional domain of either the
executive or legislative branches of government.
A. The Legacy of the New Deal
Beginning in 1933, Congress passed many reforms that President
Roosevelt had initiated to rebuild a national economy weakened by
depression. It soon became apparent that the federal regulatory mea-
sures comprising much of the President's program were essentially
incompatible with the previously accepted theory and practice of laissez
faire.8 Certain members of the Court were, therefore, immediately alien-
5. Id. at 191-92. For a discussion of judicial role and related issues, see W.
MURPHY & J. TANENmAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIc IAw 116-49 (1972).
6. R.W. EMERSON, History, in Tim COMPLETE ESSAYS AND OTHER WRINGS OF
RALPH WALDO EMERSON 123, at 127 (Atkinson ed, 1940).
7. See notes 8-18 infra and accompanying text.
8. The basic tenets of laissez faire as they pertain to constitutional law are
summarized in B. Twiss, I.AwYERs AND THE CONsTrTUroN: How LAissEz FAmB CAWM
TO THE SUPREME COURT 8-9 (1942).
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ated from the Administration's policies.9 Others (particularly Justice
Brandeis) had serious reservations, as a matter of principle, about the
centralization of regulatory authority in the Federal Government.10 A
substantial number of the Justices believed that some of the legislation
passed at the urging of the President had not been drafted with the
necessary precision. Thus, for one reason or another, all of the Justices
were dissatisfied with at least some aspects of the New Deal.' Between
1934 and 1936, the Court declared twelve major pieces of federal
legislation unconstitutional, 12 and by the fall of 1936, had effectively
blocked much of the New Deal.
As events led to a confrontation between Congress and the Court,
Senator Sherman Minton was one of those who headed the attack on
the Supreme Court. Colorful, aggressive, and articulate, he assailed the
Court for having converted the doctrine of judicial review into a new
doctrine of judicial supremacy. In the Senate he proclaimed:
... []t became necessary after the Bill of Rights was adopted to
set up some tribunal which should have the last word as to whether or
not these fundamental rights had been invaded. In other words, if Con-
gress should pass a law which would deny the right of someone to wor-
ship God according to the dictates of his own conscience there must be
some tribunal to say "No." Where is the tribunal which is to say "No"
if Congress passes a law which is perfectly within the Constitution and
the Supreme Court strikes it down?13
The questions he repeatedly posed in the Senate were troublesome.
How was the abuse of judicial prerogative to be restrained? Was it not a
fatal omission in the American structure of government for the framers
of the Constitution to have neglected to provide some kind of meaning-
ful check on judicial decisions that ran contrary to the repeatedly
expressed desires of the people as mirrored by Congress? When Minton
was informed that the Court had only invalidated 73 of some 25,000
9. Justices Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler were ideological
adversaries of the New Deal, and voted against the constitutionality of all New Deal
programs presented to the Court for review. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238 (1936); Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
10. See Mason, The Supreme Court: Temple and Forum, 48 YALE Rv. 524 (1959).
11. Id. at 527.
12. The voting alignments, the holdings, and the acts of Congress held unconstitu-
tional during the 1931-1937 terms are summarized in Atkinson, Mr. fustice Cardozo and
the New Deal: An Appraisal, 15 VinL. L. Ra,. 68, 71 (1969).
13. 80 CONG. Rac. 9892 (1936).
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Congressional acts passed prior to the New Deal, he responded before
the Senate:
Is it simply to the credit of the Supreme Court that only 73 laws
passed by Congress have been declared unconstitutional, or is it some-
what to the credit of the Congress that it has been right in all of the
other laws it has passed?
I do not wish to appear as a critic of the Supreme Court, nor do
I wish to appear as one who is opposed to the Supreme Court['s] declar-
ing acts of Congress unconstitutional; but if this is a government of
checks and balances. . . and I think it is-then, I am in favor of some
check upon the Supreme Court.14
It became increasingly apparent to Minton that the missing check
had to come from one of two sources. Either the Justices must disci-
pline themselves and develop self-imposed restraint, or Congress must
act to curb the Court's appellate jurisdiction. Both themes are evident
in an address he made to the Senate in 1936.
They [the Supreme Court Justices] have . . . laid down . . . [a]
rule of practice of their own making, that they will not declare an act
of Congress to be unconstitutional until its unconstitutionality appears
beyond all reasonable doubt. We put nine eminent distinguished law-
yers upon the bench. Four of them say it is clearly within the Consti-
tution and five of them say it is not within the Constitution. How can
anyone say that when four of these eminent gentlemen out of nine say
that an act of Congress is constitutional, that its unconstitutionality is
clear beyond all reasonable doubt?
Congress . . . has [the power] . . . to lay down the rules and
regulations for appellate procedure before the Supreme Court ....
I should like to say here and now ... my idea about what Con-
gress can do now in order to maintain the balance of power between
the judiciary, the executive, and the legislative. It can pass an act...
[requiring] any litigant . . . who challenges the constitutionality of any
act of Congress, to convince seven of the members of that Court that
the act is unconstitutional before it can be so held.15
It would thus seem that long before his appointment to the Court in
1949, Minton's Jeffersonian populism1 6 had conditioned his attitude
14. Id. at 9893.
15. Id. at 9894-98.
16. "Jeffersonian populism" is used to denote a commitment to representative-
Vol. 1975:361] 365
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toward the Court's role in American politics. Tolerance of judicial
supremacy was inconsistent with democratic theory as he understood it,
for in such a situation an unelected oligarchy was permitted to deter-
mine vital questions of public policy without regard for public senti-
ment.
Encouraged by his reelection in 1936, President Roosevelt offered a
plan to reconstruct the Supreme Court. His proposal, announced on
February 5, 1937, asked that Congress permit the President to appoint
an additional Justice for each sitting Justice whose age exceeded an
established retirement age of seventy, with the Court's total membership
not to exceed fifteen.17
Although the Court-packing plan did not succeed, by the spring of
1937 there was a noticeable change in the Court's attitude toward
Congress' use of the commerce power to regulate the economy. There-
after no legislation that was a part of the New Deal program was held
unconstitutional. Regardless of whether President Roosevelt's proposal
to alter the Court's membership was alone instrumental in causing the
change in attitude of the Court in 1937, it would at least seem that the
plan contributed, if only indirectly, to the new doctrinal ethos which
characterized the post-1937 Court.'8 No longer was the Court willing to
defend an economic system at the risk of irreparable institutional injury
to itself. The old order had abruptly ended and a new Court had
ness in government, which would exclude judicial supremacy as Jefferson understood
it. See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, in THE WRTNGs OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 50-51 (A. Lipscomb & A. Bergh eds. 1905); Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to William C. Jarvis, in id. at 276-79.
17. See generally L. BAKER, BACK TO BACK: THE DUAL BETWEEN FDR AN THE
SupRmnm CourT (1967).
18. "I don't suppose," Justice Minton observed in later life, "there has ever been
such an exhibition of judicial toe dancing as Hughes gave in his switch of the Court from
Carter v. Carter Coal Co. and United States v. Butler to Parrish and Jones & Laughlin."
Letter from Sherman Minton to Felix Frankfurter, Jan. 18, 1960, in the Felix Frankfurter
Papers (The Library of Congress). Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936),
invalidated codes established for the coal industry in the Bituminous Coal Conservation
Act of 1935, and United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), struck down the
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937), ushered in the constitutional revolution of 1937 by sustaining a state minimum
wage law, and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), upheld the
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, which assured the right of
employees to bargain collectively with their employers.
Justice Minton was apparently unaware that Justice Frankfurter had always emphati-
cally denied that there had been a "switch in time that saved nine." See Frankfurter, Mr.
Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311 (1955).
[Vol. 1975:3 61
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/2
JUSTICE SHERMAN MINTON
emerged, soon to be confronted with different constitutional questions.
But the memory of the old Court and its policies lingered in the minds
of those who had opposed it.
B. Freedom and Security Under Law
The two most catastrophic domestic events in American history-the
Civil War and the Depression-were transition points in the Court's
history, for they rechanneled the Court's energy toward new or different
issues by forcing resolutions of the questions that had brought the Court
and the nation to a time of crisis. Even as the Civil War had resolved the
question of federalism, the Depression had resolved the question of
laissez faire.19
The constitutional revolution of 1937 and its aftermath witnessed a
substantial reinterpretation of both substantive due process and the
commerce clause. It was possible for Justice Black to write, years
afterwards:
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner. . .and like cases-that due
process authorized courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they be-
lieve the legislature has acted unwisely-has long since been discarded.
We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts
do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of
legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.20
Substantive due process was satisfied in regulatory cases after 1937 if
the Court was able to conclude that there was a rational relationship
between the legislative goal desired, which had to be one which the
legislature could legitimately seek to accomplish, and the means used to
attain it.21 Similarly, in contrast to the limited definition previously given
to interstate commerce, the meaning of commerce was expanded to
include virtually all aspects of business, between and within the states. 22
The Court repeatedly declared that "no form of state activity can
constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the commerce
clause to Congress. ' 23
19. See generally R. McCLosKEY, THE AMymcA SurREM COURT (1960).
20. Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963).
21. See, e.g., Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S.
525 (1949); West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
23. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124 (1942), qtgoting United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942).
Vol. 1975:361]
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These changes in the meaning of commerce and substantive due
process were firmly reenforced by President Roosevelt's appointees to
the Court. Although Roosevelt had no opportunity to appoint anyone to
the Court until 1937, from 1937 to 1943 he was permitted to name
eight Associate Justices and one Chief Justice. It was not long before
several of the new Justices determined how they as individuals should
act and how the Court collectively should exercise its authority within
the structure of American government. A constitutional dialogue that
was to last for over two decades was established between Justices Black
and Frankfurter, both of whom pursued their divergent views with
Wagnerian intensity.2 4 Most significantly, however, the Justices who
came to the Court after 1937 seemed to have learned from the experi-
ences of their predecessors; they were more aware of the Court's
strengths and weaknesses, its legitimate responsibilities and erstwhile
liabilities.
The post-1937 Court generally maintained an activist stance, but the
subject matter before the Court changed markedly. The definition of
individual rights under the Constitution became a major concern. Jus-
tices Murphy and Rutledge joined with Justices Black and Douglas to
form a coalition that was frequently successful in expanding the scope of
constitutional rights of individuals. Cases involving blacks,2" Jehovah's
Wituesses, 26 and labor unions27 were very often resolved in those
groups' favor.
Although the Roosevelt Justices unanimously rejected the economic
dogmatism endorsed by the Court during the early 1930's, they were far
from unanimous in their approach to many cases, especially those that
presented civil liberties claims. For whatever reasons-whether personal
antagonisms or burgeoning ideological differences over increasingly dif-
ficult cases-strong dissenting opinions became increasingly common. 28
Moreover, stare decisis as an abstract principle in constitutional law held
24. See W. MENDELSON, JusicEs BLACK AND F!NKFuRTER: CoNF icr IN rH
CouRT (2d ed. 1961).
25. See, e.g., Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1945). See generally
C. PcnTHETT, THE ROOSEVELT CoURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLInCS AND VALUES
1937-1947, at 91-136 (1948).
26. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Lovell v. Griffin, 303
U.S. 444 (1938). But see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
27. See generally C. PRITCHEr, supra note 25, at 198-238.
28. See id. at 23-45.
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little attraction for some of the Justices. 29 Even Thomas Reed Powell, no
apologist for the Court in prior years, felt compelled to issue a warning:
The fact that judges exhibit readiness to undo the work of their pred-
ecessors in this field, whenever they would not have made the initial
determination, has wide repercussions. Who can tell what other land-
marks will be similarly obliterated? Where shall confidence be placed?
How far will transactions become a mere gamble as to their legal re-
suIts?3 1
For persons persuaded that institutional harmony contributes signifi-
cantly to the work and well-being of the Supreme Court, the unpredicit-
ability of the Roosevelt Court remained alarming."'
It was the particular responsibility of the Roosevelt Court to insist on
the observance of individual freedoms during World War I-. For the
most part the Court did not abdicate this responsibility, 2 even though
there were certain decisions that evoked controversy and extended dis-
cussion.83
During the period of international instability following World War II,
the perceived need for national security occasionally dictated temporary
restraints on individual freedoms. It was the Court's task to strike a
balance between freedom and security. By 1949, President Truman had
chosen three Associate Justices and one Chief Justice."4 The preference
accorded individual freedoms over national security considerations dur-
ing the tenure of the Roosevelt Court noticeably declined with the
commencement of the Vinson Court. In the early 1950's, the Court
passively accepted many of the stringent security measures enacted by
Congress and the states. 3 These decisions reflected the popular belief
29. See, e.g., Douglas, Stare Decisis, in THE SUPREME CouRT: ViEws FROM INSiDE
122 (A. Westin ed. 1961).
30. Powell, Our High Court Analysed, New York Times, June 18, 1944, § 6
(Magazine) 117, 144. See generally C. Pnrrc-m'r, supra note 25, at 46-70.
31. On the desirability of institutional harmony, see Swisher, Needed: A Rededi-
cated Supreme Court, THE JOHNs HoPKnis MAGAZINE, April, 1953.
32. See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945); Hartzel v. United States, 322
U.S. 680 (1944); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943).
33. E.g., Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943); Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
34. The Truman appointees were: Chief Justice Vinson (1946), Justice Burton
(1945), Justice Clark (1949), and Justice Minton (1949).
35. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952); United States ex rel.
Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
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that internal subversion and external aggression threatened the very
existence of the nation.
In most cases the Vinson Court let the state legislatures and the
Congress have their way. 6 In effect, the Court transposed the argu-
ments that Justice Holmes had used earlier to assail the Court's attitude
toward economic regulation to the dilemmas arising from the cold war.
Thus, a full and elaborate theory of constitutional jurisprudence, with
roots in the teaching of James Bradley Thayer37 and, later, in the
dissenting opinions of Justice Holmes, was pursued.
The prime movers behind this transformation were, foremost, the
cerebral and irrepressible Justice Frankfurter and an impressive array of
judges and academicians who were persuaded that the exercise of judi-
cial review was an undemocratic intrusion into the politically responsive
sectors of the American democracy. For these jurists, only evidence of
a clear mistake in the exercise of legislative discretion could justify
judicial intervention. 8 They insisted that Justices, as guardians of the
Constitution, also act as guardians of their judicial prerogatives. Fre-
quent resort to the veto power of judicial review over the acts of legisla-
tures, wrote Judge Learned Hand, "certainly does not accord with the
underlying presuppositions of popular government. ' 39  In the absence
of fundamental error, the Court was inclined to permit legislatures to
make the appropriate adjustments themselves. As Minton told Frank-
furter in 1951, a paramount lesson of the Court's recent history was
that "today the states do a pretty good job of correcting their own er-
rors. 40
On the other hand, the Vinson Court did evidence concern about the
rights of minorities, especially blacks.4 This was, however, an area
36. See, e.g., Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conf., 345 U.S. 128 (1953);
Buck v. California, 343 U.S. 99 (1952); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952);
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 341 U.S. 329 (1951).
37. See Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional
Law, 7 HARv. L. REv. 129 (1893).
38. See A. BIcKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUREME COURT AT THB
BAR OF PoLrncs 35-46 (1962). See generally THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POL-
ITICS: JUDcLAL ACTIVSM V. JUDiciAL RESTRAINT (D. Forte ed. 1972).
39. L. HAND, THE BmL OF RIGHTS 73 (1964). See also W. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND
THE COURT 73-78 (1962); C. PRrrcHETr, supra note 4, at 227-37.
40. Letter from Sherman Minton to Felix Frankfurter, May 7, 1951, in the Felix
Frankfurter Papers (The Library of Congress).
41. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen
v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); C. PiTCHETr, supra note 4.
While Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954), was decided after the death
[Vol. 1975:361
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss2/2
Vol. 1975:361] JUSTICE SHERMAN MINTON
where individual freedom was not in conflict with the alleged need for
extensive national security regulation.
Only slightly less significant than questions of national security were
issues involving aspects of the criminal law. The Vinson Court was
somewhat less responsive to the rights of persons accused of crime than
was the Roosevelt Court.42 The Justices were not insensitive to their
occasional disagreements about the purposes of criminal law. Once,
when Minton had chided him about being "soft" on crime, Frankfurter
responded:
One of these days I will get you to listen to me on American criminal
justice. I may be deluding myself but I do not think I am any "softer"
about crime than you are. I think such differences as we have derive
from our different experiences in regard to criminal justice.43
The Vinson Court seemed to attach less importance to procedural
safeguards for accused criminals than the Roosevelt Court,44 although
the former remained concerned if an individual had been falsely ac-
cused of a criminal act.45
The Vinson Court restricted the role of the judge more than at al-
most any other time in constitutional history. Emphasis was placed less
on individuals than on the continuity of the rule of law. Justice Frank-
furter especially warned against "leading people to think the law is de-
of Chief Justice Vinson and the appointment of Chief Justice Warren, the composition of
the Court was otherwise that of the Vinson era. The unanimous Brown opinion can thus
be taken as indicative of the Vinson Court's concern for minority rights.
42. See Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214 (1951); United States v.
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950).
43. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Sherman Minton, Oct. 8, 1953, in the Felix
Frankfurter Papers (The Library of Congress).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
45. The implications of this distinction were conveyed by Justice Minton to Justice
Frankfurter, whose usual concern for procedural matters was also evidenced in his
attitude toward the proper administration of criminal administration of criminal justice.
The protest was not that the law has not been correctly applied but with the
law itself. I may agree with that sort of protest-at least I understand it. I
do get a bit impatient with our system which seeks to cheat the law by some
specious plea that hasn't anything to do with his guilt or innocence but is only
a plea that he wasn't tried according to the rules without even hinting that the
application of the rules could have saved him. I still think even on a consti-
tutional claim a defendant should be required to show that if he were granted
a new trial he has a defense to make. Not just send him back for an exhibi-
tion of shadow boxing. I know you don't agree with this crude idea of mine.
But if law is to be respected it must be considered as something other than
a game.
Letter from Sherman Minton to Felix Frankfurter, July 15, 1955, in the Felix Frankfurt-
er Papers (The Library of Congress).
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pendent on the chance, for instance, whether I go off the Court tomor-
row and the further chance of who might take my place." 40  Respect
for stare decisis as an antidote to institutional instability, and a willing-
ness to decide only the precise legal questions brought in issue before
the Justices characterized the Vinson Court's majority.4 7  The system
of constitutional thought they implemented represented a synthesis of
the constitutional experience of the twentieth century. The members
of the Vinson Court had all observed the old Court before the Depres-
sion, and they all deplored what they had seen. It was perhaps this his-
torical awareness that caused many of the Justices to articulate their
expectations and ideals about the nature of the judicial function. They
earnestly sought pragmatic answers to recurrent questions: What
should be expected of them as individuals? What should be expected of
the United States Supreme Court as an institution?
ITI. JUsTICE MINTON'S POLITICAL LIFE AND APPOINTMENT
TO THE SUPREME COURT
Sherman Minton was born in a log cabin in the southern Indiana hill
country in 1890.48 At Indiana University he excelled in athletics, and
upon completion of his undergraduate studies he attended the Indiana
Law School, from which he was graduated summa cum laude, ranking
first in his class. With the assistance of a scholarship, he then attended
the Yale Law School, where he received the degree of Master of Laws in
1916, having been graduated cum laude. While at Yale, he was instru-
mental in establishing a legal aid society.
The law faculty at Yale included former President William Howard
Taft,4 9 whom Minton later described to Justice Frankfurter as one of the
46. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Sherman Minton, Jan. 25, 1950, in the Felix
Frankfurter Papers (The Library of Congress).
47. The importance of precedent is deemphasized in Douglas, Stare Decisis, supra
note 29. For an eloquent defense of stare decisis, see Green v. United States, 356 U.S.
165, 189 (1958) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
Justices Burton, Clark, Minton, and Reed and Chief Justice Vinson usually voted
together while on the Court. See Table in note 81 infra.
48. For biographical accounts of Sherman Minton's early years, see Proceedings in
the Supreme Court of the United States in Memory of Mr. Justice Minton, 384 U.S. v
(1966). See also 51 A.B.A.J. 663-64 (1965).
49. Also on the Yale law faculty were Senior Circuit Judge, Henry Wade Rogers,
two judges of the Connecticut courts, and Gordon Sherman, the brother-in-lav of Justice
Mahlon Pitney of the United States Supreme Court. See files of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary on the nomination of Sherman Minton (The National Archives). The
schedule of graduate law courses that Minton completed at Yale included courses in
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"bird dog" school, that is, one who observed the maxim, "first find what
the Court has said and stick to it." In his later years Minton regretted his
early instruction under Taft. As Minton candidly acknowledged to
Frankfurter, "I think my training and practice were too much in that
school. I did believe a great deal in stability, which was a fetish with
Taft."50
After serving as an Army captain during World War I, Minton
continued his formal studies in international law, Roman law, civil law,
and jurisprudence under the Faculte de Droit at the Sorbonne in Paris.
At the time of his appointment to the Supreme Court, Minton had
received more formal education than any other member of the Court.
His educational credentials put him in good stead with his colleagues
and enabled him to feel at ease with them and the able attorneys who
argued cases before the Court.
Minton unsuccessfully ran for an Indiana congressional seat in 1920
and 1930, and was a successful trial lawyer in Miami, Florida, for three
years during the middle 1920's. Not long after his second congressional
defeat, Minton became closely allied with the political machine of Paul
V. McNutt, who became Governor of Indiana in 1932. Minton achieved
wide publicity as Governor McNutt's Public Counselor of the Public
Service Commission, and through his efforts utility rates were substan-
tially reduced in Indiana. Although known as one of the original "two-
percenters" (state employees who gave two percent of their salaries to
the Governor's Democratic political organization), Minton was elected
to the United States Senate in 1934 with a plurality of sixty -thousand
votes.51 His campaign slogan was an emphatic, "You can't offer a
international law, jurisprudence, Roman law, and comparative European governments.
Graduate study in constitutional law was taught by former President Taft. Once,
Minton gave his opinion that the Supreme Court was wrong to uphold the confiscation of
nets belonging to fisherman convicted for having seined in navigable waters. The former
President responded, saying "I am afraid, Mr. Minton, that if you don't like the way this
law is interpreted, you will have to get on the Supreme Court and change it."
Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in Memory of Mr. Justice
Minton, 384 U.S. v, vii (1966).
50. Letter from Sherman Minton to Felix Frankfurter, Jan. 18, 1960 in the Felix
Frankfurter Papers (The Library of Congress).
51. There were so many new Democratic senators elected to the Senate in 1934 that
an additional bench was required on the Democratic side of the aisle. Quite by chance,
Minton was seated next to Harry S Truman, who had been elected to the Senate from
Missouri. Minton, Truman, Nathan Bachman of Tennessee, and Lewis Schwellenbach of
Washington became close friends as the occupants of "freshman row" in the back of the
Senate Chamber.
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hungry man the Constitution!"52
Senator Minton soon established himself as one of the most enthusias-
tic New Dealers in Congress, and his dedication did not go unrewarded.
He was made assistant Democratic Whip, and when Senator Lewis of
Illinois died, Minton succeeded him as the Democratic Whip, an un-
usual position for a freshman Senator. Inasmuch as Minton was an
intense advocate, his selection by his Democratic colleagues was provi-
dent, for he zealously defended some of the New Deal proposals even
when he had personal reservations about their constitutionality."8 His
intense partisanship, however, was to become a prominent issue in the
Senate Judiciary Committee hearings on his nomination to the Supreme
Court.
Senator Minton embraced all of the major reforms that comprised
President Roosevelfs New Deal. Moreover, he was an ebullient and
persistently outspoken critic of the status quo. He was, as Justice Frank-
furter once called him, an "almost pathological Democrat."" His loyalty
to President Roosevelt and the Democratic Party were exceptional even
among dedicated New Dealers. Although the precise aims of the New
Deal were sometimes unclear, Minton's voting record indicated full
agreement with the general formulation of goals proposed by President
Roosevelt.55 Accordingly, Minton voted in favor of the Administration's
labor and farm programs. In 1935, he vigorously supported the passage
of the National Labor Relations Act, which he later described as the
"greatest piece of legislation ever enacted for the benefit of the labor-
er."5 ( When he advocated a federal antilynching bill, which some critics
52. TIm, Sept. 26, 1949, at 22.
53. See Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in Memory of Mr.
Justice Minton, 384 U.S. v, x (1966) (discussing Minton's reservations about the
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act).
54. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Sherman Minton, Feb. 1, 1960, in the Felix
Frankfurter Papers (The Library of Congress).
55. In his Annual Message to the Congress on January 4, 1935, the President told
the nation that
[tihe time had come to fulfill a bold new social mission and to subordinate
profits and wealth to the general good. This he proposed to accomplish, first,
by ending the dole; second, by putting the 3,500,000 able-bodied persons on
relief rolls to work in new programs of slum clearance, rural housing, rural
electrification, and expanded public works; and, third, by inaugurating a com-
prehensive social security program to reduce the hazards of unemployment and
old age.
A. LNK & W. CATrON, AmI=mAN EpocH: A HISTORY OF Tim UNrrED STATES SINcE Tm
1890's 412 (3d ed. 1967).
56. New York Times, April 14, 1939, at 4, col. 1.
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considered a trespass on state prerogatives, he said, in response to
criticism, "I am interested in State rights; but I am more interested in
human rights. 57
Senator Minton eventually became chairman of a committee formed
to inquire into public utility holding companies. Legislation was subse-
quently enacted which provided for the dissolution of those holding
companies that could not justify themselves economically.58 Later, Min-
ton's active participation in an extensive investigation of lobbying prac-
tices precipitated a confrontation with a large segment of the press,
which neither side could thereafter really forget or forgive. His record as
a Senate investigator indicated his strong inclination toward populism,
which was reflected in his favorable votes on public policies proposed by
the Administration.
In 1937, Senator Minton vigorously defended President Roosevelt's
proposal to enlarge the membership of the Supreme Court. It has been
suggested that President Roosevelt offered Minton an appointment to
the Court, but Minton, because of the derogatory nature of his Senate
criticism of the Court, had declined.5 9 In truth, Minton had been
considered for the nomination, but it was never offered to him.6
In the campaign year of 1940, Minton supported the politically
popular Smith Act,"' and indicated his concern with subversive influ-
ences in the country. But he also supported the unpopular-in
Indiana--Selective Service Act 62 and advocated military preparedness.
After a 13,000 mile inspection tour of military installations, he conclud-
ed that the country had no "army or the equipment to fit one out if we
57. Proceedings in the Supreme Court of the United States in Memory of Mr.
Justice Minton, 384 U.S. v, xx (1966).
58. Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1970).
59. Questionnaire reply from one of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks, see note 3
supra.
60. When Justice Van Devanter retired in 1937, the Senate Majority Leader, Joseph
T. Robinson of Arkansas, had been chosen for the Court by President Roosevelt.
Interview with Justice Hugo L. Black, Jan. 2, 1968. But just before the nomination
was announced, Senator Robinson unexpectedly died. Shortly thereafter, Senator Black
was in the Senate cloakroom when Minton approached him and inquired, on behalf of
Attorney General Homer Cummings, whether Black would be willing to accept an
appointment to the Court. When Black said he would if the President should select him,
Minton told him that he had reason to know that the President had narrowed the list of
candidates to two persons; himself and Black. There is, then, strong evidence that
Minton was considered for a Court position as early as 1937. Id.
61. Smith Act of 1940, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1970).
62. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, 54 Stat. 885.
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had."' 3 Minton was unsuccessful in his bid for re-election against Ray-
mond Willis, a small town newspaper publisher. Wendell Wilkie, the
Republican Presidential nominee, who was a native of Indiana and
attended Indiana Law School with Minton carried his home state. Willis
was carried along on Wilkie's coattails and beat Minton by twenty-five
thousand votes. 64
After this senatorial defeat, President Roosevelt chose Minton to be
one of his five special administrative assistants. In this capacity Minton
was to maintain a close liaison between the White House and the
Democratic leadership in the Senate. Although he publicly referred to
the four months he spent on the Presidential staff as one of the "richest
in my life," 5 there is reason to believe his real feelings were otherwise.00
Lines of authority were uncertain, and Minton never achieved the
spontaneous rapport with Roosevelt that he always found in the com-
panionship of Harry Truman.
The most important single act of Minton's political career occurred
during the short interval he was working in the White House. When it
became apparent that the Senate wished to investigate defense plants
and related activies, it was important to decide which of several resolu-
tions& before the Senate should have the Administration's backing. The
Senator who sponsored the resolution that was adopted by the Senate
would probably serve as the chairman of the new investigative commit-
tee. Minton successfully urged that the Administration back Senator
Truman's resolution and his appointment as chairman of the defense
investigation committee, 7 a position which gave Truman sufficient
63. New York Times, May 13, 1940, at 7, col. 5.
On another occasion, while defending the need for extensive military training, Minton
said, "If we are not willing to go ahead and meet our obligations as citizens, then we
deserve what we'll get. I've got two boys and I would be ashamed if they turned their
back on their country's flag." New York Times, July 6, 1940, at 8, col. 5.
64. Harold Ickes, Roosevelt's Secretary of the Interior, maintained that Roosevelt
could have secured Minton's reelection had he gone to Indianapolis near the end of the
campaign, as Ickes had urged. Ickes felt that Minton's Senate support of the President
should have been rewarded with more campaign assistance than Minton received from
the Administration during the election. 3 H. IcKES, THE SECRET DIARY OF HARoLD L.
IcKES 362 (1954).
65. Lerner, The Supreme Court, HoLmAY, Feb. 1950, at 122.
66. Interview with a Capitol Hill friend of Justice Sherman Minton who asked to
remain anonymous, Jan. 24, 1968.
67. In a Memorandum to the President, Minton supported the resolution offered by
Senator Truman:
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national exposure to permit his subsequent selection as Vice President.68
During his fifth month of service to the President, Minton was
nominated to a vacancy on the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit. He remained on the court for eight years, writing over two
hundred opinions, which tended to be concise, clear, and unadorned by
rhetoric. The opinions usually focused on the precise issues in dispute,
and they definitely gave no evidence of the liberal social commitments
that had characterized Minton's Senate tenure.
When the Supreme Court recessed in the summer of 1949, there was
no cause to believe that its composition would change before it met
again. During the summer recess, however, Justice Murphy unexpected-
ly died in Detroit, and Justice Rutledge died suddenly in September.6 9
It is the custom of Presidents to make no mention of Supreme Court
appointments until the late incumbent is properly interred. Late in the
day of the memorial service for Justice Rutledge, President Truman
called Judge Minton and asked him to be Rutledge's successor.70
Memorandum for The President
I just talked with Jim Byrnes. Unless you disagree he will report at once
for passage the Truman resolution to investigate defense activities. This is a
matter of strategy to keep the investigation in friendly hands in the Senate and
away from unfriendly House fellows like Cox.
Barkley agrees with Jim. I agree with them. The Truman resolution is the
best out. What shall I tell Jim?
Memorandum from Sherman Minton to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Feb. 27, 1941, in the
Sherman Minton Papers (The Truman Library).
When Minton received the Memorandum back from the President, pencilled in the
lower right hand corner in the handwriting of the President was "S.M. OK FDR."
68. Minton later informed Senator Truman of what he had done in his behalf:
My dear Harry:
I enclose a little "scrap of paper" that I thought you might be interested in
seeing; and if you would like to have it to add to your papers, I shall be glad
to give it to you. You can see from a perusal of it that your old seat mate
was batting for you when he was down at the White House. You will recog-
nize the pencil memorandum at the bottom of the sheet as that of the Boss
himself.
I hope everything goes well with you in this strenuous campaign, and I have
every confidence that the result will be satisfactory on November 7. Then,
I want to come down and see you inaugurated and strike a blow for liberty
in the old familiar haunts!
Letter from Sherman Minton to Harry S Truman, Oct. 11, 1944, in the Sherman Min-
ton Papers (The Truman Library).
Years later, Justice Minton delighted to relate this episode to his law clerks, ending
with the observation, "That's how Vice Presidents are made." Then, after an appropriate
pause, he would add, "And that's how Supreme Court Justices are made." Interview with
one of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks, see note 3 supra.
69. See generally F. HARPER, JUSTICE RurILEmGE AND THE BRIGrT CONSTELLATION
335 (1965).
70. Minton was at his residence in New Albany, Indiana, when he receivedWashington U iversity Open Schola sh p
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President Truman never made his criteria for judicial appointments
explicit, other than to state, "if he is qualified, that is the only thing I
consider.171 Truman's reasons for selecting Minton were never precisely
expressed. Indeed, following the death of Rutledge there was some public
sentiment for the appointment of a Catholic (there was then no Catholic
on the Court). Attorney General 3. Howard McGrath thus became a
logical contender for the nomination. President Truman, however,
quickly selected Minton, a personal friend, loyal Democrat, and experi-
enced federal judge. Some commentators have maintained that Minton's
friendship with the President was the decisive factor behind the nomina-
tion. " It has also been suggested that President Truman wanted to
appoint someone whom he expected to vote with Justices Black and
Douglas.7 3 In the Senate, Black and Minton frequently had voted simi-
larly, and Minton was known to have a high regard for Black's judicial
abilities.74
President Truman's telephone call. Interview with Frances Kelley, Sherman Minton's
longtime secretary, Jan. 30, 1968.
71. PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNrrED STATES 479 (1949). Minton
once told Justice Frankfurter that
[alt the time Harold Burton was nominated for the Court I was in Truman's
office and he was talking about the appointment and told me that he would
have nominated Learned Hand but he was too old! And then he lived the span
of years for retirement and then some.
Letter from Sherman Minton to Felix Frankfurter, Jan. 20, 1962, in the Sherman Min-
ton Papers (The Truman Library).
72. See, e.g., H. ABRAHAM, THE JuDicIAL PRocEss 61 (3d ed. 1975).
One Washington lawyer, who was an advisor to President Truman, stated that he
believed the President's high personal regard for Minton was the major factor influencing
the appointment, and he doubted whether the President had thought much about how
Minton might vote as a member of the Court. Moreover, there is reason to believe, on
the authority of one of his colleagues on the Court, that Minton had made the President
aware that he was interested in a Court appointment.
73. This suggestion was commonly made in the political journals at the time of the
appointment. See, e.g., Ickes, Justice Rutledge, Tm NEw REPUBLIC, Sept. 26, 1949, at
20:
The nomination by President Truman of Sherman Minton of Indiana must
mean that he was aware of the importance of filling the Rutledge vacancy with
a man of the general type of Justice Rutledge, to which type Justices Black
and Douglas also conform.
74. Just before his nomination, Minton had ostensibly accepted, in a book review,
Justice Black's position that the Bill of Rights should be incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment:
The Court stands five to four, with Justice Black leading the minority. The
majority admits Justice Black's position as to the First Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution and probably as to the Sixth Amendment in a capital case.
Why the Court goes part of the way but not all the way with Justice Black
is, to say the least, illogical.
Minton, Book Review, 24 IND. L.J. 299, 302 (1949). And yet, Minton's publicly stated
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Although Minton's confirmation by the Senate was never in serious
doubt, the Senate Judiciary Committee nonetheless thoroughly exam-
ined his political and judicial record. Two issues were of particular
interest to the Committee: the state of Minton's health75 and the public
policies that he might be expected to favor on the Court.7 6 The Commit-
approval of Justice Black's position and his frequent agreement with him in the Senate
did not accurately suggest how Minton would vote on the Supreme Court, where he and
Black frequently disagreed. See Table, note 80 infra. Justice Black attributed the cause
of their later disagreement to Minton's experience on the court of appeals, where he
"became a bit more hidebound on precedent and procedure than I would have liked."
Interview with Justice Hugo L. Black, Jan. 22, 1968.
Another colleague, Justice Douglas, specifically discounted Minton's voting record in
the Senate, and pointed out the futility of selecting any man for the Supreme Court on
the basis of how he might be expected to vote. Justice Douglas also noted that the
questions with which a Senator is concerned are entirely distinguishable from the kinds
of questions upon which a Supreme Court Justice must rule, for example, the precise
meaning of the fourth amendment as applied to a certain set of acts. Interview with
Justice William 0. Douglas, Jan. 30, 1968.
75. The Committee expressed concern whether Minton's health would permit him to
perform at full capacity on the Court. In 1945 he had suffered a heart attack and had
spent some time in Walter Reed Hospital. Minton had suffered from pernicious anemia
since 1943. Senator Lucas of Illinois, Minton's principal defender in the public hearings,
testified that in spite of his health, Minton had been "for the last 3 years ...
regularly attending his duties on the Circuit Court of Appeals." Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., at 3 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
Hearing].
76. With regard to Minton's policy preferences, Senator Lucas told the Judiciary
Committee, "It]here cannot be any doubt about Senator Minton's belief in what we called
the New Deal. He went all out for it when he came here as a Senator." Hearing at 5.
Later in the proceedings, Senator Lucas said: "I think he has a liberal viewpoint, and I
think that he is progressive. There is no doubt about that." Hearing at 7.
When controversy arose over his nomination, Minton refused to testify before the
Committee inasmuch as he was a sitting judge. See Thorpe, The Appearance of Supreme
Court Nominees Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 18 J. PuB. LAw 371 (1969).
Opposition to the Minton nomination gathered momentum within the Committee when,
on September 17, 1949, Senator Homer Ferguson, a Republican from Michigan, indicated
that he wanted additional time to study Minton's record. On September 27, the Commit-
tee voted five to four in favor of a motion by Senator Ferguson to summon Minton.
Minton refused to appear and on October 1 addressed a letter to the Committee in which
he stated why he chose not to appear:
I have received your request to appear before the committee.
I, of course, desire to cooperate fully with the committee at all times but
I feel that personal participation by the nominee in the committee proceedings
relating to his nomination presents a serious question of propriety, particularly
when I might be required to express my views on highly controversial and liti-
gious issues affecting the Court.
I am informed that the principal question with which the committee is con-
cerned is my position with regard to the bill presented in 1937 to increase the
membership of the Supreme Court.
You will recall that at the time the bill in question was under discussion I
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tee vigorously inquired into allegations about Minton's senatorial intem-
perance, which might have been taken to indicate the absence of a
was assistant majority whip and, understandably, I strongly supported those
legislative measures recommended by the administration.
My record as a Senator is a public record and open to scrutiny by the Com-
mittee. It, of course, has no relationship to my record as a judge of the sev-
enth circuit court of appeals. However, my judicial record is also available for
examination. In my opinion, that record speaks for itself, as does my record
as a Senator. The latter record was open to your committee and to the Senate
in 1941 when I was unanimously confirmed by the Senate to the second highest
court in the land.
As assistant majority whip of the Senate, I was a strong partisan and sup-
ported the administration. I do not deny this. The record was made and I
stand upon it. I may have made mistakes. I likewise may have made mistakes
as a judge, but I think no man can point to one of my more than 200 opinions
in the past 8 years and truthfully say it was characterized by partisanship of
any kind. When I was a young man playing baseball and football, I strongly
supported my team. I was then a partisan. But later, when I refereed games,
I had no team. I had no side. The same is true when I left the political arena
and assumed the bench. Cases must be decided under applicable law and upon
the record as to where the right lies. I have never approached a case except
to try to find the answer in the law to the question presented on the record
before me.
As Members of the Senate you will agree, I am sure, that the proper exercise
of the duties of the senatorial office requires freedom of speech with which
to express those convictions honestly arrived at and sincerely believed in.
Under our representative system of government, the Members of both legis-
lative bodies, the Senate and the House, are the channels through which local
public opinion is brought to bear upon proposed legislation. To inhibit Mem-
bers for any reason from the full expression of their views on any given mea-
sure would be to seriously hamper the effectiveness of our legislative structure.
As a Senator and an elected representative of the people, I considered it my
duty and privilege to aid in the enactment of those proposals which I honestly
believed to be of value to the country as a whole. That my belief in regard
to some of these proposals was not shared by the majority of my colleagues,
and that the measures failed of enactment, does not alter this fact. Nearly
everything a Senator does is of a controversial nature. He must take a firm
position on legislation, without regard to the possible unpopularity of his stand.
It might be pertinent at this point to invite the committee's attention to the
fact that at least three nominees to the Court, who were confirmed in due
course, had strongly advocated the Court plan. The committee did not see fit
to query any of these gentlemen on this matter.
In conclusion I should like to refer to a statement submitted by Justice
Frankfurter when he was asked to appear before the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee in 1939...
"I am very glad to accede to this committee's desire to have me appear be-
fore it. I, of course, do not wish to testify in support of my own nomination.
* * * While I believe that a nominee's record should be thoroughly scru-
tinized by this committee, I hope you will not think it presumptuous on my
part to suggest that neither such examination nor the best interests of the Su-
preme Court will be helped by the personal participation of the nominee him-
self.
"I should think it improper for a nominee no less than a member of the
Court to express his personal views on controversial political issues affecting
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judicial temperament." Since Minton had made many public statements
criticizing the Court's work, the Committee fully explored his attitudes
toward the Court.78 The Committee was also concerned with Minton's
occasionally tempestuous relationship with the press.79 Eventually, the
the Court. My attitude and outlook on relevant matters have been fully ex-
pressed over a period of years and are easily accessible. I should think it not
only bad taste but inconsistent with the duties of the office for which I have
been nominated for me to attempt to supplement my past record by present
declarations."
While it is my desire to comply with any reasonable request of the commit-
tee, I am constrained at this time to call to its attention the serious questions
of propriety and policy which I have endeavored to outline in this letter.
95 CONG. Rnc. 13803 (1949).
On October 3, the Committee reconsidered and voted against calling Minton to testify.
The vote in favor of confirmation was nine to two.
77. Senator Wiley of Wisconsin inquired of Senator Lucas whether he had
... observed in him this change that has occurred in men even on the Su-
preme Court, who went on as radicals and excessive liberals, and have gotten
around to the point where they believe that there is apparently something else
besides this radical philosophy of life? Have you noticed this change in him?
He apparently was a great New Dealer, and his philosophy was the philosophy
of the excessive liberal. Have you noticed that he has with the years matured
in the sense that he is more judicial and more reflective, you might say? Do
you see what I am getting at?
Hearing at 9.
Senator Lucas replied:
I think that I know what the Senator is driving at, and I do not think that
there is any doubt about the fact that he has been on the bench a great num-
ber of years and that it has sobered the gentleman in his judgment, and that
no one has ever complained about his judicial temperament in comparison with
his senatorial temperament.
I am now discussing primarily what he did when he was on the floor of the
United States Senate. There were some outbursts of unusual language which
he used to make a point.
Id. at 9-10.
Senator Wiley interrupted to inquire: "He never broke desks, anyway, did he?" Id. at
10. To which Senator Lucas responded: "I don't know whether he ever did or not. I have
nothing against a Senator who wants to break a desk now and then. I think a man is
interested in his cause when he breaks his desk." Id.
78. When the Court had declared the Agricultural Adjustment Act unconstitutional,
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), Minton had risen on the Senate floor and
emotionally castigated the decision:
I disagree with the majority emphatically, and I think that their opinion is
the most strained and forced construction of the Constitution and the most
highly flavored political opinion to come from the Court since the Dred Scott
decision. . . . The cold hand of that Court should not be permitted to contam-
inate the bloodstream of the Nation and destroy the right of the people to live
and prosper. . . Although the Court has gone out of its way to wreck a sys-
tem that works, it has not gone so far, in my humble opinion, as to make our
condition hopeless.
Hearing at 8.
79. In the Senate Minton had proposed legislation that would levy fines between the
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Committee favorably reported the nomination to the Senate, where it
was approved by a vote of forty-eight to sixteen.
IV. THE NEw DEALER AS JUSTICE
How a Justice views the Supreme Court's institutional role within the
political system is likely to affect significantly his judicial behavior.
Justice Minton had strong opinions about the institutional limitations of
the Supreme Court vis-a-vis the representative branches of government
and, also, about the nature of the decisional process itself. It was here-
on the theory of judging and the interrelation of law and politics-
where he found common cause with Justice Frankfurter. With constant
cajolery and an endless charm, Frankfurter quickly drew Minton into
the Court's dominant decision-making coalition. 0
Supreme Court decision-making was, Minton believed, circum-
scribed by the separation of powers doctrine. The division of respon-
amounts of $1,000 and $10,000 against any publication convicted of having printed a
"known untruth." S. 3928, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938). At the hearing Senator Lucas
testified on this issue: "I do not know why he introduced the bill. He would have to
tell you that. Probably some newspaper got after him pretty strong, and he decided he
would retaliate. Hearing at 10. A veteran Capitol Hill reporter, who was close to Min-
ton, said that Minton did not believe in this bill, and suggested that he may have intro-
duced the "gag law" at the instigation of someone in the Administration. Interview with
a friend of Justice Sherman Minton who asked to remain anonymous, Jan. 24, 1968.
In a speech before the American Press Society in New York late in 1938, Minton had
spoken against certain practices of newspapermen. An editorial in the St. Louis Globe-
Democrat on September 16, 1938, denounced Minton in strong terms. Another editorial
accused Minton of
rudeness to witnesses, extravagent remarks on the floor of the Senate, and un-
bridled and often pointless loquacity, a blind follower of all the dreams for the
more abundant life, and a total lack of that splendid quality known as judicial
temperament.
Hearing at 5, quoting New York Herald Tribune, April 30, 1938.
Even in retirement, Justice Minton could reciprocate in kind to Justice Frankfurter:
"It makes me boil to think of the protestations of the so-called free press. They have
some stalwarts, but they are for the most part just a mouthpiece for money." Letter from
Sherman Minton to Felix Frankfurter, Feb. 26, 1958, in the Felix Frankfurter Papers
(The Library of Congress).
80. Table 1 shows the number of nonunanimous cases decided by signed opinion in
which each of the other Justices joined with Justice Minton in either a majority or
dissenting vote during each term and the percentage relationship of those cases to the
total number of signed non-unanimous decisions each term.
While Frankfurter's influence on Minton cannot be overestimated, the figures in Table
1 tentatively suggest that the core of the Vinson Court majority was composed of Chief
Justice Vinson and Justices Reed, Burton, Clark, and Minton. Justice Jackson was an
only slightly less consistent member of the majority.
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sibilities -among the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of
government was taken as a matter of fact and not merely one of consti-
tutional form. He did not acknowledge that in practice the separation
of powers is more accurately described in terms of the sharing of pow-
ers. With this perspective in mind, he drew an intransigent line between
legislating, executing, and adjudicating. Consequently, he proved read-
ily amenable to arguments urging judicial restraint when executive or
legislative activities were challenged. Consistent with -his Senate posi-
tions in defense of the New Deal, he continued to believe that if Con-
gress had the power to act it was beyond the Court's constitutional pre-
rogative to question the wisdom of the challenged legislation. This
conclusion was modified only in those relatively infrequent situations
where there existed explicit constitutional limitations clearly applicable
to either the legislative or executive branch. Unlike his former Senate
colleague, Justice Black, Minton perceived the Bill of Rights as impos-
ing constitutional limitations only in the instance of a clear legisla-
tive or executive mistake.81 Since a plausible rationale could be devel-
oped for nearly any legislative or executive action, he deferred repeated-
ly to nonjudicial judgments.8 2
Minton's theory of judging was based upon his acceptance of the
declaratory theory of law. That theory, in its most undiluted form,
holds that judges merely declare what the existing law is and then apply
it to the factual situation before them for decision.88 When applied to
Supreme Court decision-making, the declaratory theory is consistent
with the theory of separation of powers endorsed by Minton and many
other New Dealers insofar as it denies any significant policy-making
discretion to the Justices. Simply put, the responsibilty of the legisla-
ture is to make the laws, while the responsibility of the judiciary is to
interpret them. Deference to the legislature and stare decisis thus be-
come limitations on judicial policy-making, and these limitations must
be respected unless they are patently contrary to the Constitution.
To the extent that the Supreme Court is a political as well as a legal
institution, Minton was "perhaps less well suited than some for a
position on a court that is less affected by stare decisis than it is by
81. See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), where Justice Minton
joined in the majority opinion. For a helpful discussion of Wieman, see A. BICKEL, StU-
pra note 38.
82. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & SF. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953);
Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
83. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 14-36 (1963).
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arguments of policy. '8 4 His theory of judging had crystallized following
the judicial activism in the economic regulation cases that he had
witnessed and deplored during the era of the New Deal, and it was a
theory not altogether inappropriate for a federal judge sitting on a court
of appeals.8 5 But his theory of judging was more vulnerable when
applied in the context of the Supreme Court, for as the Court became
increasingly concerned with novel constitutional claims involving civil
liberties, it was in some cases "difficult for him to think of the Constitu-
tion as a living document or law-giving as a source of change or
progress." 86 Minton's general commitment to the notion that Justices
should declare rather than make law led a former clerk to offer the
following evaluation:
If he had any limitation as a judge-and he certainly had none as
a human being-it might perhaps be that his reverence for the law as
it stood when a case was under consideration would tend to make him
less flexible than others in grasping the implications of some humanistic
value that called for a distinction or a new concept.87
Although his opinions suggest that Minton was sometimes unimagi-
native, yet he was at least methodical and thorough;8 s although he was
usually prosaic,89 his opinions were clear and to the point;90 and al-
though he was a literalist in construing legislation,91 he applied this
method consistently, regardless of the identity of the parties. If he
sometimes oversimplified complex questions,9" he never complicated
simple ones, nor did he create ambiguities where none existed.98 It was,
however, the degree of his dependence on precedent that set him apart
84. Questionnaire reply from one of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks, see note 3
supra.
85. See generally M. ScmcK, LEANFD HAND'S CoUnT (1970).
86. Questionnaire reply from one of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks, see note 3
supra. See also text accompanying note 98 infra.
87. Questionnaire reply from one of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks, see note 3
supra.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
89. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 346 U.S. 346 (1953);
United States v. United States Smelting & Ref. Co., 339 U.S. 186 (1950). But cf. Bell v.
United States, 349 U.S. 81, 84 (1955) (dissenting opinion); McAllister v. United States,
348 U.S. 19 (1954).
90. See, e.g., Doud v. Hodge, 350 U.S. 485 (1956); United States v. Anderson,
Clayton & Co., 350 U.S. 55 (1955); United States v. Scovil, 348 U.S. 218 (1955).
91. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
92. See, e.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 484 (1953) (dissenting opinion); Broth-
erhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768, 775 (1952) (dissenting opinion).
93. See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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from most of his colleagues. He was once to say, in a case involving the
Secretary of Labor, that:
.lThe Secretary's] change in mind should not change the law. This
Court, which may change the law, seems to have changed its mind about
the same time and without saying why it does so, except that the fore-
going cases are of a different vintage. I am unable to distinguish the
cases on the vintage test.94
Nor was he ever able to abide a distinction based on the "vintage
test." Lengthy citations of past authority accompanied most of his
opinions.95 He remained reluctant to depart from precedent even when
the way had been partly charted. It was, therefore, commonly his
predisposition to depend on existing precedents, a practice which was
characterized by an insistent search for analogous decisions and a
steadfast refusal to mitigate seemingly harsh applications of statutory
law in the absence of significant ambiguity.90 When he confronted a case
of first impression involving legislation, he was inclined to make the
most literal reading of the statute possible. 97
Although he held to the declaratory theory of law with regard to prior
Supreme Court decisions and legislation, Minton did not entirely accept
the theory in issues involving the Constitution. In constitutional law he
was not an absolutist. He did not believe that the provisions of the
Constitution were self-executing.98 Like Justice Frankfurter, he knew
that the task of constitutional interpretation inevitably involved a Justice
in constitutional lawmaking. As Frankfurter insisted:
The problem is not whether the judges made the law, but when and
how much. Holmes put it in his highbrow way, that "they can do so
only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions."
I used to say to my students that legislatures make law wholesale, judges
retail. In other words they cannot decide things by invoking a new ma-
jor premise out of whole cloth; they must make the law that they do
make out of the existing materials and with due reference to the presup-
positions of the legal system of which they have been made a part. Of
course I know these are not mechanical devices, and therefore not sus-
94. Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 434 (1954) (dissenting opinion).
95. See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Lutwak v. United States, 344
U.S. 604 (1953); Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950).
96. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauffv. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Halseth, 342 U.S. 277 (1952); Fogarty v. United
States, 340 U.S. 8 (1950). But see United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950).
98. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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ceptible of producing automatic results. But they sufficiently indicate
the limits within which judges are to move.99
Because of Minton's respect for past decisions and his willingness to
declare them applicable to present situations, it followed that he narrow-
ly defined the limits of his lawmaking discretion.100
Moreover, Minton further restricted the range of his lawmaking
discretion by insisting on a rigorous regard for the rules of procedure
and jurisdictional access to the Court. He considered the requirements of
procedural forms and time limitations to be important, and he assumed
they had been established for good reasons. Like Frankfurter, he
was always jealous of the Court's jurisdictional prerogatives.' 0 ' "A
private litigant," said one clerk, "probably had a heavier burden to
sustain with Justice Minton to get in Court than perhaps with any other
justice on the Court at that time.' ' 02
Consequently, Minton's approach to the work of the Supreme Court
was characterized by those themes inherent in his conception of the
judicial role: a strong presumption of constitutionality in favor of ac-
tions taken by the legislative and executive branches of government,
respect for stare decisis, a cautious attitude toward judicial policy-
making, and a careful regard for the prerequisites of procedure and
jurisdiction. These views were shared, at least as general formulations,
by Frankfurter and a majority of the other Justices during the seven
terms Minton remained on the Court.
99. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Hugo L. Black, Dec. 15, 1939, in the Felix
Frankfurter Papers (The Library of Congress).
100. Organized athletics and the antitrust laws illustrate Justice Minton's approach to
policy-making. It is apparent that he enthusiastically favored the per curiam decision in
Toolson v. New York, 346 U.S. 356 (1953), which sustained a 1922 ruling that baseball
is beyond the scope of the antitrust laws. When in the following term the Court did not
extend the Toolson ruling to boxing contests, Justice Minton joined Justice Frankfurter's
dissent in which there was an appeal to stare decisis, and he also filed his own dissent
where he expressed his belief that:
[wihen boxers travel from State to State, carrying their shorts, and fancy dress-
ing robes in a ditty bag in order to participate in a boxing bout, which is
wholly intrastate, it is now held by this Court that the boxing bout becomes
interstate commerce.
United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236, 251 (1951). Both stare decisis
and a strong set of personal values converged in these cases; Justice Minton was very
enthusiastic about sports and was inclined to protect them.
101. See Atkinson, Justice Sherman Minton and Behavior Patterns Inside the Su-
preme Court, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 716, 734-35 (1974).
102. Questionnaire reply from one of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks, see note 3
supra.
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Unlike Justices Black or Frankfurter, Minton was not consciously a
legal theorist. In his conversation with his law clerks or the other
Justices, and in his opinions, he usually did not discuss abstract ideas or
a coherent theory of constitutional law. As one of his law clerks con-
cluded, "I think his views were entirely ad hoc, a case-by-case reliance
on precedent and the facts and logic of the matter at hand."108 Another
clerk substantially agreed: "He was a great pragmatist, and I think fairly
consistent, but he was often guided by common sense and fairness as he
saw it, and so in the last analysis he may not have had a real theory of
constitutional adjudication." 104 Nonetheless, there was an overall pattern
in his Supreme Court behavior. His commitment to judicial restraint
required him to minimize his policy-making discretion and prevented
him from translating the political and social ideals he had once held in
the Senate into constitutional law.
After his appointment in 1949, Minton generally conformed to the
prevailing mood within the Court, which mirrored a widespread and
continuing reaction against the willingness of the pre-Roosevelt Court
to invoke the power of judicial review against the acts of the repre-
sentative branches of government. Thus, Minton consistently joined
Court majorities that enforced stringent measures against internal
threats to national security. On a few occasions, however, he was
prepared to acknowledge the need for far-reaching judicial policy-
making in the absence of congressional action, as when he agreed with a
unanimous Court in Brown v. Board of Education.'0 5
Although Sherman Minton was one of the most zealous legislative
activists in recent political history, by the time he joined the Court the
intensity of his populist idealism had waned, perhaps because eight years
on a court of appeals had inculcated a self-restrictive sense of judicial
role. 10 6 One of his colleagues remembered without enthusiasm that
103. Questionnaire reply from one of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks, see note 3
supra.
104. Questionnaire reply from one of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks, see note 3
supra.
105. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Justice Minton's vote was never in doubt. See Ulmer, Earl
Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. POL. 689 (1971).
106. Justice Harlan succinctly summarized this transition by noting that Justice
Minton started as a politician but became a jurist. He attributed the transition to Justice
Minton's service on the court of appeals, where he believed Justice Minton was able to
develop a judicial temperament. Interview with Justice John Marshall Harlan, Jan. 30,
1968.
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as a Supreme Court Justice, Minton was "Mr. Mainstreet."' 07
V. CONCLUSIONS
In American constitutional history there are few individual contrasts
more striking than Sherman Minton's impassioned advocacy of populist
reform in the United States Senate and his cautious, self-denying per-
formance on the Supreme Court. The evidence points toward an expla-
nation of his behavior based upon his conception of the judicial role,
which he shared-most prominently-with Felix Frankfurter. Conse-
quently, any general evaluation of Justice Minton's contribution to the
development of constitutional law cannot be divorced from considera-
tion of the desirability of self-restraint as a standard for decision-making
on the Court.10 8
Minton's attitudes toward judicial role were nurtured by his legisla-
tive and prior judicial experiences and his intra-court relationships.
Similar views were held by many elected officials. Presidents, both
Democrat and Republican, historically have tended to favor a Supreme
Court with a low profile. As President Truman told his first Court
appointee, Harold Burton, "I want someone who will do a thorough
judicial job and not legislate. I know you will do that because we have
talked about it."'1 9 This sentiment was fully shared by Minton when
President Truman sent him to the Court.
Minton's reputation as a Supreme Court Justice can further be as-
sessed in terms of the impact of both his work on the Court as an
institution and his substantive contributions to constitutional develop-
ment. First, the immediate impact of Minton's tenure on constitutional
development was substantial. He joined with Justices Frankfurter and
Reed, and three other Truman appointees, Chief Justice Vinson, and
Justices Burton and Clark, in many decisions affecting the nation's
public policies. As Justice Douglas remembered, Minton "had a Court"
in the great majority of the cases in which he participated. 1"0 He sel-
107. Interview with a Supreme Court Justice, Jan. 1968.
108. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 38; C.L. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE CouRT:
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DEMOCRACY (1960); THE SUPREME COURT il" AMERICAN PoLrrIcs:
JUDICIAL ACTIVISM V. JUDICIAL RESTRAINT (D. Forte ed. 1972).
109. Justice Harold H. Burton's Diary, Sept 17, 1945, in the Harold H. Burton
Papers (The Library of Congress).
110. Interview with Justice William 0. Douglas, Jan. 30, 1968. See also Atkinson,
Justice Sherman Minton and the Balance of Liberty, 50 IND. L.J 34 (1974).
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dom found himself isolated, except in his last years, and he accurately
reflected the majority sentiment within the Vinson Court.
Minton was, therefore, a member of the Court's dominant decision-
making coalition, which often looked to Justice Frankfurter for intellec-
tual leadership. "Minton was no match for Frankfurter," Justice Doug-
las recalled, but it was not necessary that he be, for they seldom
disagreed-at least on major questions."' Minton was in one sense a
disciple, won by Frankfurter's lavish praise and pleasant blandishments.
But Minton was receptive to Frankfurter's overtures in large part be-
cause the two Justices were in basic agreement on the proper role of
the Supreme Court in the American system of government. The rela-
tionship was bound by mutual respect, which was somewhat unusual,
since Frankfurter was frequently drawn to the extremes of condescen-
sion or obsequiousness in his relations with persons in public life.112
The relationship was not premised on the kind of intellectual kindred-
ship that existed between Holmes and Brandeis; but it was based upon
a general agreement on many of the issues confronting the Court, and
it was aided by Minton's respect for Frankfurter and Frankfurter's de-
light in Minton's willingness to accept his teaohing. As his own partisan-
ship had furnished Minton with a standard of behavior while he was
in the Senate, so Justice Frankfurter's constitutional jurisprudence
furnished him with a standard while he was on the Court.
Minton's expressed political ideals and his partisan affiliation with the
Democratic party suggested at the time of his appointment that he might
vote frequently with Justices Black and Douglas. His case is a classic
illustration of a Justice whose behavior on the Court did not conform to
the behavior which had been commonly, and perhaps too hastily, pre-
dicted on the basis of his prior political activities."18 Careful scrutiny of
Minton's behavior prior to his nomination might have indicated his
developing judicial conservatism. Indeed, when Minton was nominated,
111. Interview with Justice William 0. Douglas, Jan. 30, 1968. See also Atkinson,
supra note 101.
112. See generally FROM TH DLUuES OF FEo.x FRANKFURTER (J. Lash ed. 1975).
113. See generally Lardner, Judges as Students of American Society, 24 IND. W. 386
(1949). Lardner notes that
[ludicial biographies of recent years-particularly those written by political
scientists-are based on two assumptions: that the social philosophy of the
judge will be reflected in his judicial opinions; and that his early life and ex-
periences had a controlling effect on the molding of the philosophy which he
read into the law as a judge.
Id. at 386.
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Professor Fred Rodell offered a prediction which, however overstated,
was not wholly inaccurate:
Minton's slant is less the product of profound or original thinking than
of enthusiastic party regularity. A political radical, he is nevertheless
an intellectual conservative. And that essential conservatism, that yen
for the regular, may yet, unhappily, prove responsive to the little
blandishments which Justice Frankfurter has already started lavishing
on Minton to try to draw him into the camp of the Court's now clearly
conservative majority." 4
Second, Minton had an important functional impact on the day-to-day
activities of the Court. Within the Court he acted as a kind of har-
monizer, where he was probably better liked personally than anyone
else."' His gregariousness and lack of pretension permitted him to main-
tain continuous social relationships with all of the Justices. Thus, his
role as a mediating influence on the Court was complex and significant,
even if the immensity of the undertaking drove him into occasional
despair." '
Third, Minton had a significant functional impact on the Supreme
Court's status within the political system. His voting behavior tended
to support institutional stability which added to the Court's popular
image as an ex cathedra arbiter of merely legal disputes. Even as his
behavior within the Court was aimed at minimizing conflict, his voting
behavior was motivated by a belief that external evdence of internal
conflict had to be minimized. Minton's conception of the Supreme
Court's proper restrained role within the political system may have
been particularly suited to the enhancement of the Court's popularity
among the general public. It may be that an activist Court, whatever
its values, eventually loses esteem in the public mind, whereas a relatively
passive Court, not in conflict with the representative branches of
government, may receive a somewhat higher level of popular support.
Finally, when Sherman Minton's work on the Supreme Court is
examined for its impact on long-term constitutional development, most
114. Rodell, The Supreme Court is Standing Pat, Tm NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 19, 1949,
at 12.
115. Believe me, my experience through the first term on the Court has been
enriched by my association with you and the cordial manner in which you re-
ceived me into the circle I shall always remember. Maybe I did disappoint
some of my colleagues-if you were among them you concealed it with gra-
cious tolerance.
Letter from Sherman Minton to Felix Frankfurter, June 17, 1950, in the Felix Frank-
furter Papers (The Library of Congress).
116. See generally Atkinson, supra note 101.
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students of the Court would conclude that it was, if viewed against the
full history of the Court, of little lasting significance. Judicial accom-
plishment usually is a relative and intangible concept, meaningful only
in intra-Court comparisons. But even when legitimate variations in judg-
ment are considered, it is possible to distinguish between those Justices
who achieved distinction and the majority, including Minton, whose
accomplishments were more modest.
The circumstances of history did not directly favor Justice Minton's
work. One of his law clerks, who had affectionate regard for him,
compared the history of Minton's service on the Court to "the history
of a dinosaur or a mastodon."" 7 The clerk continued:
If this is true [that President Roosevelt tendered a nomination to
Minton in 1937], it is probably regrettable for purposes of his place in
history [that he was not appointed], because his ideas were very appro-
priate for the 30's. Then he would have voted right down the line with
those who felt that it was not the Court's business to impose its personal
views upon the Congress or the people. He could have been remem-
bered with the magic names of Hughes, Holmes, Stone, Brandeis, Car-
dozo. By the time he did come to the Court the swing had gone back
to the activists. Although the personal views of a Black or Douglas are
considerably different from those of a McReynolds or Butler, they are
still imposed under the same legal theory, ascribed to Justice Field, of
"substantive due process." Minton thought basically in the political
philosophy of the minority of previous years, Holmes, Stone, Hughes,
"don't interfere with political decisions," or, "due process has only a pro-
cedural meaning."'118
But as it was,
[m]ost of the law clerks [working for the other Justices] regarded him
as a proud political reactionary, definitely heartless on civil rights and
the rights of criminals. Through the years, most of the law clerks re-
garded him as some sort of ogre and felt that we who worked for him
were pitiful victims straight out of Dickens."19
117. Questionnaire reply from one of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks, see note 3
supra.
118. Questionnaire reply from one of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks, see note 3
119. Questionnaire reply from one of Justice Sherman Minton's law clerks, see note 3
supra.
supra. A candid assessment was offered by one of Justice Burton's law clerks:
If you wanted to think of a fellow to open the clams and have a drink with,
you couldn't have a finer person. Why he was qualified to sit on the Supreme
Court of the United States is totally beyond me. Totally.
Interview with one of Justice Harold H. Burton's law clerks, June 24, 1970.
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The lasting significance of Minton's work is further diminished by
the simplicity of his approach to the judicial process. 120 He was with-
out the apparent intellectual complexity that characterized some of his
predecessors and contemporaries. Frankfurter may have had this very
much in mind when he wrote to Minton: "For once, you will note, a
case seems to be less complicated to me than it is to you."''
An examination of Minton's opinions discloses certain other judicial
limitations. First, he sometimes was given to stating the issue in a way
that assured the result he intended to reach.'22 He wrote opinions as an
advocate for the view he had adopted. Second, few Justices in recent
times have been as concerned about precedent as Minton. 123 A danger
raised by unwavering adherence to precedent is that the current social or
economic implications of an issue may be neglected. A reluctance to
stray from precedent may cause the stagnation of desirable constitution-
al development. Third, Minton's preference for a literal interpretation of
statutes may have caused him to give insufficient attention to the public
policy demands that necessitated the legislation.1 2 4 Where others on the
Court found ambiguities in statutory language he frequently found
none.125 Minton's literal approach to statutory construction was apt to
120. For a balanced evaluation of Justice Minton's work by one of his law clerks, see
Wallace, Mr. Justice Minton-Hoosier Justice on the Supreme Court, 34 IND. L.J. 146,
377 (1959). Justice Frankfurter was pleased with the articles and conveyed his reaction
to Justice Minton:
July 7, 1959
Dear Shay:
Now that I have read the two articles on a Hoosier Justice I should like to
tell you how fortunate you were to have a fellow who is evidently greatly de-
voted to you not to offend your critical sense by saying foolish or gushy things
about you. He did a very serviceable thing to systematize your opinions and
to make clear the sturdy philosophy which binds them together.
Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Sherman Minton, July 7, 1959, in the Felix Frank-
furter Papers (The Library of Congress).
Justice Minton's response was: "I would have been greatly embarrassed if he had
written a lot of guff to make me appear as something I am not." Letter from Sherman
Minton to Felix Frankfurter, July 21, 1959, in the Felix Frankfurter Papers (The Li-
brary of Congress).
121. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Sherman Minton, May 19, 1954, in the Felix
Frankfurter Papers (The Library of Congress).
122. For a critical review of Justice Minton's first term on the Supreme Court by
one of his law clerks on the court of appeals, see Braden, Mr. Justice Minton and the
Truman Bloc, 26 IND. LJ. 153 (1951).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344 U.S. 43 (1952); Buck v.
California, 343 U.S. 99 (1952); United States v. Halseth, 342 U.S. 277 (1952).
124. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1949). But
see United States v. Alpers, 338 U.S. 680 (1950).
125. Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952); Adler v. Board of Edue., 342 U.S. 485
(1952).Washington University Open Scholarship
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hinder the implementation of public policies adopted by the legislature,
and his strong adherence to precedent tended to conceal the policy-
making actually undertaken by the Court.
On the other hand, his opinions demonstrated his penchant for con-
cise organization. He was able to get immediately to the essential issue in
each case. As Justice Black put it: "In his opinions, Shay went for the
jugular."126 He would state the issue, his conclusion, and then give quite
simply the reasons for his conclusions. 127 One might not always agree
with his reasons, but he made no effort to conceal them in studied
verbiage. He put them on display; they could seldom be misunderstood.
Moreover, Minton's Supreme Court opinions, like those written when
he was on the court of appeals, were competent and, at their best, even
gave evidence of technical adroitness, as when in one case Frankfurter
told him he had done "a true lawyer-like job. Greater praise is not in my
vocabulary."'128 This praise was to be remembered by Minton after he
had gone into retirement, when he reminded Frankfurter:
I tried to act on the bench like a lawyer and not a superman from
Capitol Hill! Maybe I was neither-I think you said one time I acted
lawyer-like which was to me a great compliment.129
However Sherman Minton's judicial performance is assessed, there
can be no doubt that he was a significant participant in our nation's
political history. Upon leaving the Court, he returned to Indiana, and on
the occasion of his 70th birthday reporters asked him what had been the
most exciting period of his life. Not unexpectedly, he replied that it had
been the New Deal. "It was part of the remaking of the country," he
said. And then he added, with an awareness of his own place, "We were
in a revolution and I was close to the throne."'' 0
126. Interview with Justice Hugo L. Black, Jan. 22, 1968.
127. In his opinions, Justice Minton developed no style that distinguished his work, or
especially contributed to the Court's status, partly because he believed the real work of
the Court was in deciding cases, not writing opinions. He seldom strayed from the
narrow facts of any case and his opinions were often rather colorless. As a jurist he was
not eloquent, but some of his clerks have suggested that his opinions might have been
better fashioned if he had invested more time in them.
128. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Sherman Minton, regarding Barrows v. Jack-
son, 346 U.S. 249 (1953), in the Sherman Minton Papers (The Truman Library).
129. Letter from Sherman Minton to Felix Frankfurter, Jan. 18, 1960, in the Felix
Frankfurter Papers (The Library of Congress).
130. Associated Press release, Oct. 20, 1960,
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